





If shortest jobs are served ﬁrst, splitting a long job into smaller
jobs reported under diﬀerent aliases can reduce the actual wait until
completion. If longest jobs are served ﬁrst, the dual maneuver of
merging several jobs under a single reported identity is proﬁtable.
Both manipulations can be avoided if the scheduling order is random,
and users care only about the expected wait until completion of their
job.
The Proportional rule stands out among rules immune to splitting
and merging. It draws the job served last with probabilities propor-
tional to size, then repeats among the remaining jobs. Among split-
proof scheduling rules constructed in this recursive way, it is charac-
terized by either one of the three following properties: an agent with a
longer job incurs a longer delay; total expected delay is at most twice
optimal delay; the worst expected delay of any single job is at most
twice the smallest feasible worst delay. A similar result holds within
the natural family of separable rules.
Key words: probabilistic scheduling, merging, splitting, propor-
tional rule.
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11 Introduction
Processing jobs of diﬀerent lengths that share a single server raises multi-
ple issues of incentive-compatibility and fairness when agents are impatient.
Here we focus on two related maneuvers by which the users may be able
to "game" the scheduling discipline, namely splitting one’s job into several
smaller jobs requested under diﬀerent aliases (so that the server believes they
come from diﬀerent users), or merging the jobs of several users into one large
job presented to the server by a single agent.
Such maneuvers are feasible when the server cannot monitor the identity
of the real beneﬁciaries of the jobs it processes. In large networks such as
the Internet, aliases are easy to generate and not easy to track, raising con-
cerns about the vulnerability of Peer-To-Peer systems (Douceur [2002]). In
such context, preventing merging and splitting is simply not feasible. Alter-
natively, the unability to detect the real identity of users may be a design
constraint of the system, meant to protect the users’ privacy because the
jobs involve conﬁdential information. Think of users sharing a medical or
ﬁnancial data base.
In line with most of the scheduling literature (e.g., Lawler et al. [1993]),
we assume that partially completed jobs are useless, so that an eﬃcient server
processes jobs whole. Splitting is a non cooperative manipulation where agent
A who needs a job of size x, creates several aliases A’,A",.. and requests on
their behalf jobs of sizes a,a0,a”,..such that a + a0 + a”+·· = x.I ft h ej o b
completed last among A,A’,A",.., is done strictly earlier than job A in the
initial problem, the maneuver is proﬁtable. Merging is the cooperative move
where agents A,B,C,.., who need jobs of sizes a,b,c,.., choose one of them to
request a single job of size x = a + b + c + ··. The merged agents schedule
their true jobs as they please during the time where job x is processed, and
can enjoy the beneﬁt of their own job as soon as it is completed. Merging
is proﬁtable if the waiting time of at least one merged agent can thus be
reduced, without increasing that of any other.
Many deterministic service disciplines are either "merge-proof" or "split-
proof" but not both. The familiar Shortest Job First is by far the most
popular scheduling rule, because it minimizes total waiting time accross all
users It is merge-proof because a merged job is never served earlier than any
of its component jobs, but is badly vulnerable to splitting. Similarly, Longest
Job Firsts (that maximizes total waiting time) is clearly "split-proof" but
not merge-proof. We prove in Section 3 that no deterministic scheduling rule
2is both merge-proof and split-proof.
Randomizing the service ordering of jobs is the easiest way to restore
fairness when eﬃciency compels to process them whole. Here we submit an-
other advantage of randomization: if we assume that each participant seeks
to minimize the expected wait until the completion of his or her job, we can
construct probabilistic scheduling rules that are simultaneously split-proof
and merge-proof. Our punchline is that among such rules, one rule dubbed
the Proportional rule stands out uniquely for its fairness and eﬃciency prop-
erties. On the way to a formal statement of this result, we ﬁnd that Split-
proofness eliminates many more natural rules than Merge-proofness.
In order to explain the appeal of the Proportional rule, it is useful to
contrast it with the simplest split-proof and merge-proof rule, namely the
Uniform scheduling rule choosing each ordering of the n participants with
equal probability 1/n!, thus ignoring all diﬀerences in job lengths1.G i v e n
n jobs of sizes x1,..,x n, the simplest deﬁnition of the Proportional rule is
recursive: choose ﬁrst the job scheduled last, with the probability of job i
being
xi
x1+··+xn; then select in the same way the job scheduled next to last
among the remaining jobs, and so on. It is easy to see that for any two jobs
i,j the probability that j is scheduled before i is
xi
xi+xj, hence the name of
this rule2.
We now compare these two rules from the point of view of one equity test
(Ranking) and two performance indices (the excess delay and the liability),
and ﬁnd that Proportional systematically dominates Uniform.
The longer the job, the larger the externality it creates upon other par-
ticipants. Ranking requires that, as a result, the longer the job the longer its
expected wait: : if xi <x j,t h e nyi−xi ≤ yj−xj. This kind of test is familiar
to the fair division and cost sharing literature (e.g., Moulin and Sprumont
[2003]). The Proportional rule meets Ranking, whereas the Uniform rule im-
poses a longer expected delay to a smaller job (xi <x j ⇒ yi −xi >y j −xj).
1The expected wait of job i with size xi is yi = xi + 1
2
P
j6=ixj, because there is a 50%
chance that any other job j precedes job i. When a coalition of users other than i merge
their jobs, or when user j,j 6= i, splits her job, the sum
P
j6=ixj is unaﬀected, and so is
user i’s expected wait. By Pareto optimality it follows that neither the splitting agent nor
the merging coalition can beneﬁt. See Ozsoy [2005].
2When user i splits his job into several smaller "subjobs", one checks that the expected
delay until completion of all subjobs is precisely the same as that of the initial job (see
comment 1 in Section 10). Merge-proofness of the Proportional rule requires more work:
Proposition 2 in Section 6.
3Our two performance indices are inspired by two conﬂicting normative
goals playing a central role in the management of queues: to minimize the
total expected waiting time of users, which leads to the Shortest Job First
discipline; and to equalize slowdown accross users, namely the ratio of waiting
time to job size. The former is a utilitarian concern for eﬃciency, whereas
the latter is the idea of equalizing the (relative) delay externality experienced
by each user. See Demers et al. [1990], Bender et al. [1998], Friedman
and henderson [2003], Wierman and Harchol-Balter [2003], and references in
Moulin [2005].
We deﬁne in Section 7 the (relative) excess delay of a rule as the worst
ratio of actual to optimal expected delay, where the maximizatio bears on all
scheduling problems. The excess delay of the Proportional rule is 2,w h e r e a s
it is unbounded for the Uniform rule. We deﬁne the liability of a rule as the
worst expected slowdown of that job, when other jobs are arbitrarily large.
The liability of the Uniform rule is, again, unbounded, because the expected
wait of a job goes to inﬁnity when other jobs are inﬁnitely larger. Under the
Proportional rule, the liability of any job is n, the number of other jobs in
the queue. This is the same liability as under Shortest Job First, and about
twice the optimal liability.
Our two main results, Theorem 1 and 2 in Sections 8 and 9, assume one
of two invariance properties satisﬁed by the Proportional and many other
scheduling rules. A rule is separable if the relative ranking of any subset of
jobs is independent of other jobs’ sizes. It is recursive if it is generated by n
independent successive draws, choosing ﬁr s tt h ea g e n ts e r v e dlast,t h e nt h e
agent served next to last in the reduced problem with n − 1 agents, and so
on. The Proportional and Uniform rules are both separable and recursive,
and the combination of these two properties produces the rich class of quasi-
proportional r u l e s( S e c t i o n5a n dP r o p o s i t i o n3 ) .
Among split-proof scheduling rules that are either separable (Theorem
1), or recursive (Theorem 2), the Proportional one is characterized by any
one of the following three properties: Ranking; the excess delay is at most 2;
the liability of any job is at most n, the number of users.
2 Related literature
This paper is inspired by three essentially independent streams of micro-
economic literature: the ﬁrst one applies the mechanism design approach
4to queuing and scheduling, the second one discusses splitting and merging
maneuvers in various fair division problems, and the third one studies the
random assignment of homogeneous indivisible commodities.
We start with the research on scheduling and queuing (under the assump-
tion that only completed jobs matter) when monetary transfers are feasible.
That literature typically assumes quasi-linear preferences in money, and lin-
ear waiting costs. One idea is to propose fair monetary compensations by
applying solutions concepts from cooperative game theory: the Shapley value
is increasingly popular for the scheduling model (Curiel et al. [1989],[2002],
Klijn and Sanchez [2002], Maniquet [2003], Chun [2004 a,b]); in the queuing
problem, Haviv and Ritov [1998], Haviv [2001] apply the Aumann-Shapley
pricing rule to various service disciplines. A diﬀerent, and more developed,
theme is to design cash transfers ensuring the truthful revelation of waiting
costs. This leads to interesting (in particular, budget-balanced) Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanisms, or generalizations thereof: Dolan [1978], and
more recently Suijs [1996], Mitra [2001,2002]. Closer to our model, Hain
and Mitra [2001], Kittsteiner and Moldovanu[2003 a,b] consider the truthful
revelation of job sizes, assuming that agents cannot be punished ex post for
misreporting. In our model the system manager can punish users who mini-
mize ex ante the length of their job, and they have no incentive to exagerate
the size of their job either.
The companion paper Moulin [2004] discusses merging and splitting ma-
neuvers in the quasi-linear scheduling model just discussed. The results there
are less encouraging than in the probabilistic model of this paper, in the sense
that no eﬃcient mechanism can be both split-proof and merge-proof. Just
like here, Merge-proofness proves much easier to meet than Split-proofness.
Unlike here, the normative consequences of split-proofness are dire: it is in-
compatible with either Ranking, a ﬁnite individual liability, or the monotonic-
ity of the net waiting cost in one’s job size.
The follow up paper Ozsoy [2005] explores the robustness of our results to
partial transfers of jobs and to a coalitional version of the splitting maneuver.
More on this and the companion paper in Section 10 (comment 4).
We turn to the discussion of splitting and merging in the fair division
literature. The earliest contribution deal with the rationing problem (Banker
[1981], Moulin [1987], De Frutos [1999], Ju [2003]) where the proportional rule
is the only one immune against such maneuvers. In the quasi-linear social
choice problem, the same property leads to the egalitarian division of surplus
(Moulin [1985], Chun[2000]), and in the cost sharing problem with variable
5demands, to the Aumann-Shapley rule (Sprumont [2004]). Most of these
results are surveyed in Ju et al. [2003].
Finally the problem of randomly assigning homogeneous indivisible units
(Moulin [2002], Moulin and Stong [2002,2003]) can be interpreted as the
couterpart of the current model under processor sharing. Each user requests
a job of size xi ,where xi is an integer, and the server processes successive unit
jobs, typically alternating between the diﬀerent users (instead of serving jobs
w h o l e ) .T h i si sn o ti n e ﬃcient if partially completed jobs bring positive utility.
Another Proportional rule emerges in that model, in which xi balls of color
i are thrown in an urn, and the server empties the urn without replacement
to determine the order in which the
P
xi unit jobs are processed. In Section
5 we show that the Proportional rule here can also be generated by throwing
xi balls of color i in an urn, then serving the jobs (whole) in the order in
which each color "vanishes" from the urn. The key axioms in the processor
sharing model are diﬀerent, yet the invulnerability to transfers plays a role (
see Theorem 1 in Moulin and Stong [2003]).
3T h e m o d e l
The inﬁnite set N of potential users is ﬁxed throughout. A scheduling prob-
lem is a pair (N,x) where N is a ﬁnite subset of N,a n dx is a proﬁle of non-
negative job sizes, xi ∈ R+ for all i ∈ N. The set of orderings of N is Φ(N),
with generic element σ : σ(i) <σ (j) means that job i is served/scheduled
before job j.
We prove ﬁrst our earlier claim that without randomization, all rules are
vulnerable to at least one of merging and splitting. The simple argument
does not require a formal deﬁnition of these properties (given in Section 6).
A deterministic scheduling rule selects an ordering σ ∈ Φ(N) for any problem
(N,x). Assume without loss of generality that when agents A,B,C each have
a job of size 2, the rule orders them alphabetically. If now A,B show up with
jobs (a1,b 1)=( 2 ,4), A must be served ﬁrst, otherwise B and C both reduce
their wait by merging in the initial three person problem. If B,C show up
with (b2,c 2)=( 4 ,2), B must be served ﬁrst otherwise B shortens his wait by
splitting into (a0,b 0)=( 2 ,2). Next consider the problem (a,b,c)=( 1 ,4,1) .If
B is served last, then at (b2,c 2), C splits advantageously to (a”,c”) = (1,1).
If B is served second at (a,b,c),a n dA , Cm e r g ei n t oa1 =2 , the one served
ﬁrst beneﬁts strictly whereas the other suﬀe r sn oh a r m ;i fBi ss e r v e dﬁrst at
6(a,b,c),b o t hA , Cb e n e ﬁt by merging. This contradiction proves our claim.
From now on, we allow the server to schedule jobs randomly. A random
ordering is a probability distribution p on Φ(N); the set of such distributions
is denoted ∆[Φ(N)]. We assume that each user i only cares to minimize the
expected completion time yi of her own job. Given the random ordering p
and a problem (N,x), this "disutility" is
yi = xi +
X
j∈NÂi
prob{σ(j) <σ (i)|x}·xj (1)
where prob{σ(j) <σ (i)|x} =
P
σ:σ(j)<σ(i) pσ(N,x).
Conversely, our ﬁrst result describes those proﬁles y ∈ RN
+ feasible at
a given problem (N,x), namely such that (1) holds for some lottery p ∈
∆[Φ(N)].D e ﬁne for all x ∈ RN





S(2) xi·xj,w h e r eS(2) is the set (with cardinality
|S|·(|S|−1)
2 )o fn o n
ordered pairs from S.N o t et h a tv is supermodular with respect to S.
Lemma 1
i)The proﬁle y ∈ RN
+ is feasible at (N,x), x ∈ RN
+ , if and only if for all i
{xi =0= ⇒ 0 ≤ yi ≤
P




xi · yi = v(N,x) and
X
S
xi · yi ≥ v(S,x) for all S ⊆ N.
ii)The proﬁle y ∈ RN
+ is eﬃcient at (N,x), x ∈ RN
+ , if and only if for all
i {xi =0= ⇒ yi =0 },a n dm o r e o v e rx · y belongs to the core of the game
(N,v(·,x)). We denote by F(N,x) the set of eﬃcient proﬁles y at (N,x).
Statement i) is proven in Queyrane [1993]. For the sake of completeness
we provide a (diﬀerent) proof in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 implies that if all jobs are positive, all random orderings are
eﬃcient, because the weighted sum
P
N xi · yi is independent of the choice
of p. W h e ns o m ej o b sa r en u l l ,e ﬃciency only requires to schedule all null
jobs before any non-null job.
From now on we write x ≥ 0 for x ∈ RN
+,a n dx À 0 whenever all
coordinates are positive.
Deﬁnition 1
An eﬃcient scheduling rule is a mapping ρ associating to each problem
(N,x),xÀ 0, a random ordering ρ(N,x)=p ∈ ∆[Φ(N)].
7An eﬃcient scheduling method is a mapping µ associating to each problem
(N,x),x≥ 0,a ne ﬃcient proﬁle µ(N,x)=y ∈ F(N,x).
We only need to deﬁne eﬃcient scheduling rules over strictly positive
proﬁles x, because the relative ordering of null jobs is irrelevant, as long as
they are served before all non null jobs. On the other hand, an eﬃcient
scheduling method is deﬁned for all proﬁles, because the wait of null jobs
is unambiguous; moreover it will prove convenient in Section 6 to deﬁne a
method for all proﬁles in RN
+.
In the sequel when we speak of a method or a rule, we always mean that
it is eﬃcient.
4 Split-proofness and Separability
We start by a three users example. In the problem (N,x) where N = {1,2,3},
assume that user 3 r e p o r t sa st w oa g e n t s3,4 and splits her (true) job of
size x3 into two jobs of sizes x∗3,x ∗4,w i t hx∗3 + x∗4 = x3. After splitting,
user 3 must wait until both "sub-jobs" are completed hence the delay she
experiences from job i,i =1 ,2 is determined by the probability that this job
is scheduled before at least one of the sub-jobs. Setting x∗ =( x1,x 2,x ∗3,








The following notations are used in the general deﬁnition of Split-proofness.
Given a problem (N,x),x≥ 0, a coalition T such that T ∩ N = ∅,a n da n
agent i∗ ∈ N, the splitting of i∗into i∗∪T creates a new problem (N∗,x ∗),x ∗ ≥
0,w h e r eN∗ = N ∪T, xi∗ =
P
i∗∪T(x∗)i, (x∗)j = xj for j ∈ NÂi∗.N o t et h a t
we can always assume that the initial job is positive, xi∗ > 0, because a null
job has no incentive to deviate; on the other hand we allow some coordinates
of x∗ to be null, because by splitting xi∗ into x∗ such that (x∗)i∗ =0 ,(x∗)j =
xi∗,a g e n ti∗ eﬀectively assumes a new identity as agent j, and such maneuvers
are both realistic and important in the proof of Lemma 2 below.
Deﬁnition 2
Fix a scheduling rule ρ, a problem (N,x),x≥ 0,a n dT,i∗ as above. We say
that ρ is split-proof at (N,x) with respect to T,i∗ if






We say that ρ is split-proof if it is split-proof for all (N,x),T,i ∗.
The right-hand side of the above inequality is the (true) expected wait of
agent i∗ after the split.
We introduce next a key invariance property of scheduling rules, under
which Split-proofness takes a much simpler form. Moreover all rules discussed
in the paper meet this property. Given N,S,S ⊂ N, and σ ∈ Φ(N),w ew r i t e
σ[S] ∈ Φ(S) for the restriction of σ to S.
Deﬁnition 3
T h es c h e d u l i n gr u l eρ is separable if for all N,S,S ⊂ N, x À 0,t h e





pσ(N,x) is independent of NÂS and of x[NÂS]
For a separable rule ρ,w es p e a ko ft h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a taj o bo fs i z exj for
user j precedes a job of size xi for user i, without specifying either the rest of
the participants or the size of their jobs: we write this probability θ
i,j(xi,x j),





i,j(xi,x j) · xj (3)
Lemma 2
The separable scheduling rule ρ is split-proof if and only if the corresponding
method is anonymous (θ
i,j = θ is independent of i,j), and moreover for all






σ(j) <σ (i)|(b,aj)} (4)
Proof
Statement "if". Fix (N,x) and T,i∗ as in the premises of Deﬁnition 2. By
assumption yi∗(N,x)−xi∗ =
P
NÂi∗ θ(xi∗,x j)·xj.N e x tt h et e r mprob{σ(j) <
maxi∗∪T σ(i)|x∗} depends only upon (x∗)[j∪i∗∪T] by Separability of ρ.T h u s
inequality (2) follows from θ(xi∗,x j) ≤ prob{σ(j) < maxi∗∪T σ(i)|x∗},w h i c h
is precisely (4) for S = i∗ ∪ T .
9Statement "only if". We show ﬁrst that θ
i,j is independent of i,j.F i x
a,b > 0 and consider in problem N = {1,2},x =( a,b),t h es p l i to fa g e n t
1 into agents 1,3 with (x∗)1 =0 ,(x∗)3 = a. In the split problem, agent 1
is scheduled ﬁrst by eﬃciency, so the probability that agent 2 is last is just
θ
2,3(b,a). Thus split-proofness implies θ
2,1(b,a) ≥ θ
2,3(b,a). Exchanging the








Next ﬁx S,i,i / ∈ S,and b,aj as in the premises of (4) and choose an agent
1 ∈ S.I nt h ep r o b l e mN = {1,i},x=( aS,b) as p l i tb y1 to S with (x∗)j = aj
for all j ∈ S cannot beneﬁta g e n t1: this gives inequality (4), and completes
the proof.¥
Examples of scheduling rules illustrating Deﬁnitions 1,2 and Lemma 2 are
the subject of the next Section.
5 Parametric rules
We construct a large family of separable scheduling rules by choosing for
each a>0 a cumulative distribution function Fa on [0,+∞[ with no mass at
0. Thus Fa is any non decreasing and right-continuous function on [0,+∞[
such that Fa(0) = 0 and Fa(∞)=1 .
Deﬁnition 4
Given a scheduling problem (N,x),x À 0,t h eparametric rule associated
with the family {Fa,a>0} picks |N| independent random variables Zxi,o n e
for each i ∈ N with cdf Fxi, and orders jobs according to the realization of
these variables, breaking ties randomly with uniform probability.
Separability is clear. Parametric rules are also anonymous, namely for
all N, the mapping x → p(N,x) is symmetric in all variables for x À 0.I n
particular θ
i,j = θ is independent of i,j:
θ(a,b)=prob{Za <Z b} +
1
2
prob{Za = Zb} for all a,b. (5)
Three benchmark parametric rules are: Shortest Jobs First, for which Fa is
concentrated at a so that θ(a,b)=1if b<a ; Longest Jobs First, where Fa
is concentrated at 1
a and θ(a,b)=1if a<b ; and the Uniform rule, for which
Fa does not depend on a,s ot h a tθ(a,b)=1
2 for all a,b.
Next we deﬁne a rich subset of parametric rules playing a key role below.
Deﬁnition 5
10Let w be a function on R+,s u c ht h a tw(0) = 0 and a>0 ⇒ w(a) > 0.
Given a scheduling problem (N,x),xÀ 0,t h ew−quasi-proportional rule is
t h ep a r a m e t r i cr u l ea s s o c i a t e dw i t hFa(z)=m i n {zw(a),1} for all z ≥ 0.
The Uniform rule is quasi-proportional with w(a)=1for all a>0.T h e
S h o r t e s t( r e s p .L o n g e s t )J o bF i r s tr u l ei st h el i m i to ft h eq u a s i - p r o p o r t i o n a l
rules w(a)=aα,w h e nα goes to +∞ (resp. to −∞). The Proportional rule,
to which our main results are devoted, corresponds to w(a)=a. Another
remarkable quasi-proportional rule is the Quadratic one, for which w(a)=a2
(see Lemma 5 in Section 7.2). Our terminology becomes clear when we
compute the method corresponding to a quasi-proportional rule.
Lemma 3
Fix N,a no r d e r i n gσ ∈ Θ(N),a n dap r o ﬁle x À 0 .S e twk = w(xσ−1(k)),
so w1 (resp. wn) is the weight of the job scheduled ﬁr s t ( r e s p .l a s t ) .T h e



















· xj for all i ∈ N
Proof.
Because the distribution of each variable Zi i sn o na t o m i c ,a n dt h e s ev a r i a b l e s
are independent, the probability of a tie Zi = Zj is null. Hence, with the
notations above, the probability that ordering σ is selected is that of the event
{Z1 ≤ Z2 ≤ ·· ≤ Zn},w h e r eZi follows a beta distribution with parameter wi.
This is precisely (6), as follows from a simple computation that we reproduce




























11There is an alternative, perhaps more intuitive deﬁnition of quasi-proportional
rules, for those problems (N,x) where the numbers w(xi) are all rationals,
namely w(xi)=
bi
d for some integers bi,d. For each agent i put bi balls of
color i in an urn and empty the urn by successive draws with uniform proba-
bility and without replacement; schedule the jobs in the order in which each
c o l o rv a n i s h e si nt h eu r n( w h e nt h el a s tb a l lo ft h i sc o l o u ri sd r a w n ) .T h i s
generates precisely the random ordering in Lemma 33.
Applying Lemma 2 to parametric rules yields a simple suﬃcient condi-
tion for Split-proofness in that family. Fix a parametric rule {Fa,a > 0}
and assume for a moment that all distributions Fa are atomless (i.e., Fa is
continuous). As ties occur with probability zero, inequality (4) amounts to
prob{ZaS ≤ Zb} ≥ prob{max
S
Zaj ≤ Zb} ⇐⇒
Z ∞
0




which holds true if FaS(z) ≥ Πj∈SFaj(z). The latter inequality is in fact
suﬃcient for Split-proofness, whether or not the corresponding distributions
have atoms.
Proposition 1
If the cdfs {Fa,a>0} satisfy Fa·Fb ≤ Fa+b for all a,b > 0,t h ec o r r e s p o n d i n g
parametric rule is split-proof.
Corollary
The w−quasi-proportional rule is split-proof if and only if w is subadditive.
The proof of Proposition 1 for distributions with atoms is in the Appendix.
Proof of the Corollary
For the w−quasi-proportional rule, the cdfs Fa are atomless. Inequality
Fa(z)·Fb(z) ≤ Fa+b(z) is always true if z ≥ 1, and amounts to w(a)+w(b) ≥
w(a + b) if z<1. This proves the "if" statement. Conversely, suppose
the w−rule is split-proof. By Separability, inequality (4) must be true. As
Πj∈SFaj(z)=z
S




S w(aj),t h e r e -














3I am grateful to R.J. Aumann for pointing out this interpretation.
12implying the subadditivity of w.¥
A natural choice of the weight function w is the power function w(a)=aα
for some real number α4. This includes all the rules discussed after Deﬁnition
5. For these rules, the Corollary says that split-proofness is equivalent to
α ≤ 1, hence includes the Uniform, Proportional, and Longest Job First
rules.
6 Merge-proofness and demand monotonic-
ity
W es t a r tw i t ha5a g e n t se x a m p l e . I nt h ep r o b l e m(N,x),w h e r eN =
{1,2,3,4,5}, asssume that the coalition {1,2,3} merges its jobs. This
means that they report as a single agent of the coalition, say 1∗,aj o bo f
length x∗
1∗ = x1 + x2 + x3, and choose freely a scheduling order, possibly a
randomized one, of their "true" jobs in the time interval chosen by the server
to process the merged job. Write y∗
1∗ for the expected wait of the merged
job of size x∗
1∗,s ot h a ty∗
1∗ − x∗
1∗ is the expected delay of job x∗
1∗ generated
by jobs 4 and 5. This delay is borne by all three agents upon merging. The
other part of their true wait comes from the processing order of jobs 1,2,
and 3: Lemma 1 describes the range F({1,2,3},(x1,x 2,x 3)) of the corre-
sponding proﬁles of expected waits. Summing up we see that the proﬁle
e y =( e y1,e y2,e y3) of expected waits is feasible for {1,2,3} after merging if and
only if e y ∈ (y∗
1∗ − x∗
1∗) · (1,1,1) + F({1,2,3},(x1,x 2,x 3)).I f y is the proﬁle
o fw a i t sb e f o r em e r g i n g ,t h i sm o v ei sp r o ﬁtable if and only if there exists e y
such that e y ≤ y with at least one strict inequality.
Notice that the description of successful merges only uses the schedul-
ing method, not the actual scheduling rule from which it is derived. This
simpliﬁes greatly the analysis of Merge-proofness. Now some notations.
Given a problem (N,x), a proper subset (coalition) T of N, and an agent
i∗ ∈ T,t h em e r g e ro fT into i∗ creates a new problem (N∗,x ∗),w h e r e




j = xj for j ∈ NÂT.W e w r i t e e for
the vector in RN with all coordinates equal to 1.F i n a l l yt h es e tF(T,x[T])
(Lemma 1) consists of the proﬁles of expected waits feasible for coalition T
when it is scheduled before NÂT .
4These rules are Scale Invariant,n a m e l yρ(N,x)=ρ(N,a· x) for all a>0,a n dt h i s
property is characterictic within the quasi-proportional family. See Ozsoy [2005].
13Deﬁnition 6
Given a scheduling method µ, a problem (N,x),x≥ 0,a n dT,i∗ as above, we
set y = µ(N,x) (before merging) and y∗ = µ(N∗,x ∗) for the (reported) waits
after merging. We say that µ is vulnerable to merging by T,i∗ at problem
(N,x) if there exists a vector e y[T] ∈ RT such that





xi) · e[T] + F(T,x[T]); e y[T] ≤ y[T] and e y[T] 6= y[T] (7)
We say that the method µ is merge-proof if it is not vulnerable to merging
at any problem by any coalition. We say that the scheduling rule ρ is merge-
proof if the associated method is.
Merge-proofness is easy to achieve because it is implied by the combina-
tion of a separability property less demanding than Deﬁnition 3, and of a
mild monotonicity property stating that the expected delay of a job is non
decreasing in its size.
Deﬁnition 7
T h es c h e d u l i n gm e t h o dµ is demand monotonic if for all N, and i ∈
N, yi(N,x) − xi is non decreasing in xi. The scheduling rule ρ is demand
monotonic if the associated method is.
Increasing the size of my job augments the delay externality, and it is
only fair that my share of this externality should not decrease.
It is easy to check that the w−quasi-proportional method is demand
monotonic if and only if w is non decreasing. Longest Job First is not demand
monotonic, but the Uniform, Proportional and Shortest Job ﬁrst methods
are. More generally, the parametric rule {Fa,a>0} is demand monotonic if
a → Za is stochastic-dominance monotonic , i.e., {a ≤ b} ⇒ {Fb(z) ≤ Fa(z)
for all z}. The proof of this fact is in the Appendix, as Step 2 in the proof
of Proposition 1.
Our next result applies to all scheduling methods derived from separable
scheduling rules, and more generally to the following class of methods.
Deﬁnition 8
T h es c h e d u l i n gm e t h o dµ is separable if there exists for all i,j ∈ N a
function θ
i,j from R2
+ into [0,1], such that for all a,b ≥ 0
θ
i,j(a,b)+θ
j,i(b,a)=1 ,a n da>0 ⇒ θ
i,j(a,0) = 1. (8)
and such that equation (3) holds for all N,x,x ≥ 0.
14It follows from Lemma 1 that for any choice of the functions θ
i,j meeting
(8), equation (3) deﬁnes a feasible proﬁle of expected waits. Indeed θ
i,j ≥ 0 ⇒ P
S xi · yi = v(S,x)+
P
i∈S,j∈NÂS θ
i,j(xi,x j) · xi · xj ≥ v(S,x). Yet this does




An anonymous, demand monotonic, and separable scheduling method is merge-
proof. For instance the w−quasi-proportional rule is merge-proof if w is non
decreasing.
Proof
We show ﬁrst a preliminary result. The scheduling method µ is merge-
p r o o fi ff o re v e r y(N,x),x≥ 0,T,i ∗ as in Deﬁnition 6, with y = µ(N,x) and
y∗ = µ(N∗,x ∗),w eh a v e
X
T
xi · yi +
X
T(2)






(recall that T(2) is the set of non ordered pairs in T). Consider a vector
e y[T] in the set deﬁned in property (7). Using the notation
P
T xi = xT,w e
compute from Lemma 1
X
T
xi · e yi = xT · (y
∗










T xi·e yi, and implies that {e y[T] ≤ y[T]
and e y[T] 6= y[T]} is impossible.
We pick now an anonymous, demand monotonic and separable method
deﬁned by the function θ. Demand Monotonicity implies that θ(a,b) is non
decreasing in a, because yi({i,j},x) − xi = θ
i,j(xi,x j) · xj is non decreasing
in xi.W ep r o v e( 9 )f o ra n yN,x,T,i∗ by developing this inequality with the
help of (3). The term
P





















5For a given matrix [θ
i,j(xi,x j)] = [ti,j] with non negative entries such that ti,j+tj,i =1 ,
the existence of a lottery p ∈ ∆(Φ(N)) such that prob{σ(j) <σ (i)} = ti,j for all i,j is not
guaranteed. On this diﬃcult existence problem, see Fishburn [1992].
15Thus the LHS of (9) is x2
T +
Pj∈NÂT
i∈T θ(xi,x j)·xi ·xj.T h eR H Si sxT ·[xT + P






θ(xi,x j) · xi] ≤
X
j∈NÂT
xj · [θ(xT,x j) · xT].
This holds if a → θ(a,b) · a is superadditive for b>0 (the inequality above
always holds if xj =0 ). The latter is true if θ(a,b) is non decreasing in a
and θ ≥ 0.¥
Remark 1 A plausible statement is that an anonymous separable method
is merge-proof if and only if it is demand monotonic. This is not true, how-
ever. We saw in the above proof that the anonymous separable method deﬁned
by θ is merge-proof if a → θ(a,b) · a is superadditive. Hence the w−quasi-
proportional rule is merge-proof if a → a · w(a) is superadditive6.W e c a n
choose such a function w that is not everywhere increasing, and the corre-
sponding quasi-proportional rule is not demand monotonic.
Combining Propositions 1 and 2, we see that the w−quasi-proportional
rule is split-proof and merge-proof if w is non decreasing and subadditive.
F o ri n s t a n c ea m o n gt h ew e i g h tf u n c t i o n sw(a)=aα, these two properties
hold in the interval 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,t h et w oe x t r e m ep o i n t so fw h i c ha r et h e
Uniform and Proportional rules.
B u tw es t r e s st h a tt h e r ea r em a n yo t h e rm e r g e - p r o o fa n ds p l i t - p r o o fp a r a -
metric scheduling rules. It suﬃces that the cdfs satisfy Fa · Fb ≤ Fa+b ≤ Fa
for all a,b > 0. Two examples are the cdfs Fa(z)=m i n {
(1+a)z
a+z ,1},a n d
Fa(z)=e
− a2
z(a+z). Moreover, Merge-proofness and Split-proofness are stable
by convex combinations of (lotteries over) rules. As the parametric rules are
not stable by convex combinations, we can thus generate many more rules
both merge-proof and split-proof.
7 Ranking, Excess Delay and Liability
7.1 The Ranking axiom
Deﬁnition 9
6Indeed this implies for all a,a0 : w(a + a0) ≥ a
a+a0w(a)+ a0
a+a0w(a0); applying the
concave and increasing function f(z)= z
z+w(b) to both sides of this inequality gives the
superadditivity of a · θ(a,b)=
a·w(a)
w(a)+w(b) as claimed.
16T h es c h e d u l i n gm e t h o dµ meets Ranking if for all N,x,x ≥ 0,a n di,j ∈ N
xi ≤ xj ⇒ yi(N,x) − xi ≤ yj(N,x) − xj
The interpretation of Ranking is similar to that of Demand Monotonicity,
with the diﬀerence that it makes interpersonal comparison of delay shares.
Another similarity is that both axioms are easy to express for anonymous
separable methods, hence for all parametric rules.
Lemma 4
The anonymous separable method deﬁned by θ (θ
i,j = θ does not depend on
i,j) meets Ranking if and only if θ(a,b) is non decreasing in a for all b>0
and





The "if" statement follows by developing the inequality yi − xi ≤ yj − xj
with the help of (3). To prove "only if", apply ﬁrst Ranking in the two
person problem N = {1,2},x =( a,b), to get the upper bound on θ(a,b).
Next show by contradiction that θ(a,b) is non decreasing in a.S u p p o s ef o r
some a,a0,b>0,w eh a v ea<a 0 and θ(a,b) >θ (a0,b). Consider the problem
N = {1,2,..,n},x=( a,a0,b,..,b):f o rn l a r g ee n o u g hw eg e ty1−x1 >y 2−x2,
in contradiction of Ranking.¥
Thus Ranking is strictly more demanding than Demand Monotonicity
for separable methods. For instance the w−quasi-proportional method is
demand monotonic iﬀ w is non decreasing, whereas Ranking requires that
w(a)
a be non decreasing. The latter property implies that w is superadditive.
Compare with the Corollary to Proposition 1: split-proofness is equivalent
to subadditivity of w.I fw(a)=aα, Ranking amounts to α ≥ 1 and Split-
proofness to α ≤ 1. The results of the next two Sections show that this
tension occurs in the much larger classes of separable or recursive rules.
7.2 Excess delay and limited liability
We refer to the Introduction for the motivation of our two measures of welfare
performance of a scheduling rule.
We write ∇(N,x) for the smallest feasible total delay at problem (N,x),




17a) The (relative) excess delay of a scheduling method µ is δ(n)=s u p x
yN(x)−xN
∇(N,x) ,
where n is an integer and the supremum is over all subsets N of N with n
agents and all proﬁles x ≥ 0.
b) The liability of a scheduling method µ is the function λ(n)=s u p i,x
yi(x)
xi ,
where n is an integer and the supremum is over all subsets N of N with n
agents, all i ∈ N,a n da l lp r o ﬁles x ≥ 0.
The liability of Shortest Job First is λ(n)=n, because the worst that
c o u l dh a p p e nt oj o bi is that all other jobs are barely shorter than xi.B u t
the optimal (smallest feasible) liability is about twice smaller.
Lemma 5
i) The Quadratic method (w(z)=z2) has the liability λ
∗(n)=n+1
2 .
ii) The liability of any method µ is not smaller than λ
∗: λ(n) ≥ λ
∗(n). Thus
λ
∗ is the optimal liability.
Proof
For an arbitrary method µ,c o n s i d e rap r o b l e m(N,x) where xi = a for





2 · a2. Therefore maxi yi ≥
(n+1)




and statement ii. For statement i, consider the anonymous separable method
µ associated with θ.F o r a n y N,i,a n da>0,c o m p u t ei’s worst expected








θ(a,xj) · xj = a +( n − 1)sup
b>0
θ(a,b) · b
Thus µ has liability λ
∗ if and only if supb>0 θ(a,b)·b = a
2. The latter equality
checks easily for the quadratic method.¥
Note that there are other methods with minimal liability λ
∗, for instance
the Serial method deﬁned in Section 9. But among quasi-proportional rules,
only the Quadratic one delivers λ
∗7.
The above proof gives the simple form of the liability λ for anonymous
separable methods:













b for all a,b ≥ 0.





18For such methods, the index of excess delay δ takes also a similar simple
form.
Lemma 6
Consider an anonymous separable method µ deﬁned by θ.T h e nδ(n)=δ is
independent of n,a n d







Observe ﬁrst that δ(n) is non decreasing in n.I n d e e d i f w e a d d t o a n y
problem (N,x) a new agent 0 with a null job, neither the optimal delay
∇(N,x) nor the expected delay yN(x) − xN under µ are aﬀected. Next we
set β =s u p b≥a>0 θ(a,b) · b−a
a , ﬁx an arbitrary problem (N,x) and compute
yN(x) − xN =
X
N(2)




xi · (1 + θ(xi,x j) ·
xj − xi
xi
) ≤ (1 + β) · ∇(N,x)
Thus δ(n) ≤ 1+β for all n.W h e nN = {1,2} and x1 ≤ x2, equation (12)
reduces to
yN(x) − xN = x1 · (1 + θ(x1,x 2) · x2−x1
x1 )=∇(N,x) · (1 + θ(x1,x 2) · x2−x1
x1 )
implying δ(2) = 1 + β.¥
An easy consequence of equations (10) and (11) is that δ is inﬁnite if and
only if λ(n) is inﬁnite for all n.
Lemma 6 applies to all parametric methods, in particular to the quasi-
proportional ones. We conclude this section by computing our two indices
for some of the latter methods. Start with a w−method where r(z)=
w(z)
z is
















Therefore the excess delay and liability are both ﬁnite if and only if r is
bounded away from 0 and from +∞. For instance w(z)=zα with α<1 has
inﬁnite excess delay and liability.




r(b) ≥ 1, by considering the cases a ≥ b and a ≤ b separately; hence
w(a)
w(a)+w(b) · b
a ≤ 1 so liability and excess delay are both ﬁnite. Straightforward
computations for w(z)=zα with α ≥ 1 give




; λ(n)=1+( n − 1)
(α − 1)1− 1
α
α
for 1 ≤ α ≤ +∞
Liability decreases with α,f r o mλ(n)=n for α =1(Proportional method)
until λ(n)=n+1
2 for α =2(Quadratic method); it increases with α beyond
2, and its limit is λ(n)=n at inﬁnity (Shortest Job First).
The excess delay decreases for all α, from δ =2for the Proportional




2 ' 1.21 for the Quadratic rule, and δ =1at inﬁnity.
8 Characterization of the proportional method
Our ﬁrst characterization result contains two statements explaining a general
trade-oﬀ between Ranking and Split-proofness for any separable rule. The
third statement says that the proportional rule lies on the cusp of this trade-
oﬀ. Recall from Lemma 2 that the method associated with a separable and
split-proof rule is anonymous.
Theorem 1
i)If the separable rule ρ is split-proof, then λ(n) ≥ n for all n;
ii)If the separable method µ meets Ranking, then λ(n) ≤ n for all n.
iii)If the separable rule ρ is split-proof and meets at least one of
Ranking,or {δ ≤ 2},o r {λ(n) ≤ n for some n}
then its method is Proportional.
The proof of Theorem 1, combined with that of Theorem 2, is in the
Appendix.
Remark 2 For |N| =4it is easy to construct a separable and split-proof
rule that is not the Proportional one. I conjecture that such a construction
is possible for |N| = ∞ as well. This suggests that Theorem 1 cannot be
improved into a characterization of the Proportional rule.
209 Recursivity and characterization of the pro-
portional rule
For our second main result, we introduce another invariance property of
scheduling rule satisﬁed by quasi-proportional rules and many other rules
as well. Consider equation (6) in Lemma 3: pσ is computed recursively by
ﬁnding ﬁrst the probability wn Sn
1 wk that user σ−1(n) be ranked last in problem
(N,x), multiplying it by the probability that user σ−1(n−1) be ranked last in
the reduced problem (NÂσ−1(n),x [NÂσ−1(n)]), and so on. Here the notation
x[S] is the projection of x ∈ RN
+ on RS
+ .In other words the rule is entirely
determined by the probability distribution of the job served last.
Deﬁnition 11
T h es c h e d u l i n gr u l eρ is recursive if there exists for all N and all x À 0
a probability distribution π(N,x) ∈ ∆(N), such that for all σ ∈ Φ(N) with
σ−1(n)=i
pσ(N,x)=πi(N,x) · pσ[NÂi](NÂi,x[NÂi])
We extend the deﬁnition of π(N,·) to RN
+ Â0 by setting πi(N,x)=0when-
ever xi =0and πi(N,x)=πi(S,x[S]),w h e r eS is the set of positive coordi-
nates in x.
The quasi-proportional rules are recursive, as well as separable. It turns
out that the combination of these two properties essentially characterizes
the quasi-proportional family. See Subsection 11.3 in the Appendix for a
statement and proof.
Not all parametric rules are recursive. Deﬁne the Serial rule as the para-
metric rule such that the cdf Fa is uniform on [0,a], i.e., Fa(z)=m i n {z
a,1}.
Here (5) gives θ(a,b)= a
2b if a ≤ b, =1− b
2a if b ≤ a.T h u sf o rap r o ﬁle x











This formula explains the serial terminology. Indeed user i’s expected wait
does not depend on the sizes of jobs larger that his own: yi(x)=yi(x0) if
x and x0 only diﬀer in coordinate j, j 6= i,a n dxi ≤ xj <x 0
j,t h e nyi(x)=
yi(x0).T h i si st h eserial principle discussed by Sprumont [1998] and others.
Moreover, the Serial scheduling method is clearly the only mapping x → y
21meeting the three properties: equal treatment of equals (xi = xj ⇒ yi = yj), P
N xi · yi = v(N,x) (Lemma 1), and the serial principle.
It is easy to check that in a typical 3 person problem the Serial rule is
not recursive. Moreover it is not split-proof. On the other hand it achieves
the optimal liability because supb>0 θ(a,b) · b = a
2.
Theorem 2
The Proportional rule is the only recursive and split-proof rule that meets at
least one of
Ranking, or {δ(2) ≤ 2}, or {λ(2) ≤ 2}
Remark 3 Parallell to Lemma 2, we have a suﬃcient condition for Split-
proofness among recursive rules. The recursive scheduling rule ρ is split-proof
if for all N,i ∈ N,j / ∈ N,a n da l lx ∈ RN
+,e x ∈ R
N∪j
+
{x[NÂi] = e x[NÂi], xi = e xi+e xj} =⇒ {πk(N,x) ≥ πk(N ∪j,e x) for all k ∈ NÂi
This says that when agent i splits his job in two (or more) pieces, the
probability that another job is scheduled last does not become larger. Loosely
speaking, each function πk(N,x) is subadditive upon splitting8
Remark 4 An dual deﬁnition of Recursivity works by drawing the user
scheduled ﬁrst in the given problem, then repeating in the reduced problem and
so on. For instance if we schedule i ﬁrst with probability 1
w(xi),t h er e s u l t i n g
rule is separable and the probability that job j precedes job i is
w(xi)
w(xj)+w(xi),
just like with the rule of Deﬁnition 2. These two rules are diﬀerent with
three or more users, but they implement the same method. However this
dual deﬁnition of Recursivity does not yield interesting Split-proof rules. For
instance the dual Proportional rule (scheduling i ﬁrst with probability 1
xi)i s
not Split-proof.
10 Concluding comments and Open problems
1 Split- and Merge-invariance.
The Uniformmethod meets a stronger property than merge-proofness, namely
it is Merge-invariant. When a coalition merges, it can achieve after merg-
ing precisely the same proﬁle of expected wait as before merging, and no
better. Moreover users outside the coalition are not aﬀected by the merge.
8The proof is available upon request from the author.







xi) · e[T] + F(e T,x[T]). (13)
It turns out that the Uniform method is the only merge-invariant scheduling
method9. Thus merge-invariance is not compatible with even a modicum of
responsiveness, or a ﬁnite cap on individual liability or excess delay.
On the other hand, the Proportional rule is Split-invariant, namely split-
ting one’s job is a matter of indiﬀerence. To check this, observe that the
cdfs Fa(z)=za satisfy Fa · Fb = Fa+b for all a,b > 0, therefore inequality
(4) is actually an equality for the Proportional rule, and the same holds true
for inequality (2), expressing that the expected wait of agent i∗ is the same
before and after the split.
While Merge- invariance single-handedly characterizes the Uniform rule,
t h eP r o p o r t i o n a lr u l ei sn o tt h eo n l ys p lit-invariant rule. Yet it is character-
ized by Split invariance within our two benchmark families:





xi+xj for all N,x,x ≥ 0,a n di.
i)The Proportional is the only recursive and split-invariant scheduling rule10.
2 Queuing problems
Parametric rules have a natural extension to queuing problems, where jobs
are born at arbitrary dates. Each time a new job i of size xi is born, we draw
the variable Zi with cdf Fxi independently of the draws of all Zj corresponding
to jobs born earlier, and we process jobs in the preemptive priority deﬁned by
these realizations. This deﬁnition preserves the property of merge-proofness
provided the reported merged job is born not earlier than the youngest of
the component jobs; it preserves split-proofness as well, if the split jobs are
born not earlier than the true job. Thus the extended Proportional rule
remains equally appealing because of these two properties, plus Ranking and
the same liability n · a,w h e r en is the number of jobs not yet completed or
not yet born when job a appears. Whether or not the characterizations of
the Proportional extend to the queuing context is left for future research.
3 An open question.
9The proof is available upon request from the author.
10The proof is similar to that of Theorems 1 and 2. It is available upon request from
the author.
23Is Recursivity a necessary assumption in Theorem 2? I.e., can we ﬁnd split-
proof rules meeting at least one of Ranking, {δ(2) ≤ 2},o r{λ(2) ≤ 2},a n d
diﬀerent from the Proportional one? I conjecture that such rules exist.
We can replace Recursivity in Theorem 2 by the assumption that the
rule is parametric. Recall that many parametric rules are not recursive (e.g.,
the Serial rule); clearly many recursive rules are not separable, hence not
parametric. If a rule is split-invariant, or if it is split-proof and meets one
of Ranking, {δ(2) ≤ 2} and {λ(2) ≤ 2 for all a}, the argument in Step 3
of the proof of Theorem 2 shows that for all N,x,i, the probability that
i is scheduled last is proportional to xi. I have shown that this property
characterizes the Proportional rule among continuous (atomless) parametric
rules11, and conjecture that the same holds among all parametric rules.
4 Transfers and coordinated splitting.
A strategic maneuver related to merging and splitting is the partial trans-
fer of jobs among users. Two (or more) agents choose to reallocate their jobs
of sizes x1 and x2 as x0
1 and x0
2,w i t hx1 + x2 = x0
1 + x0
2. The transfer of jobs
encompasses splitting, by taking x2 =0 , and merging, by taking x0
2 =0 .
Ozsoy [2005] shows that the Proportional rule is not vulnerable to pairwise
transfers, i.e., involving only two agents. The same is true for all quasi-
proportional rules with w(a)=aα and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. However, transfers among
three agents can be proﬁtable under these scheduling rules, except for the
U n i f o r mr u l e .T h el a t t e ri si n v u l n e r a b l et ot r a n s f e r sa m o n ga n yn u m b e ro f
agents.
Another strategic maneuver threatening the Proportional rule is the co-
operative version of splitting: several agents split each job into smaller pieces,
and decide on the allocation of these slots conditional upon the actual ser-
vice ordering. Again, the Uniform rule stands out as the only simple method
immune to such coordinated splitting tactics (Ozsoy [2005]).
In the quasi-linear model of the companion paper Moulin [2004], no ef-
ﬁcient rules is invulnerable to transfers involving three or more agents, but
pairwise transfer-proofness points to a one-dimensional line of rules borne by
two appealing rules, one split-proof and the other merge-proof. These solu-
tions are not built on any proportionality idea, but apply instead the Shapley
value to an appropriate cooperative game. They can also be derived from
invariance or consistency properties (Maniquet [2003], Chun [2004 a,b]).
11The proof is available upon request.
24References
[1] Banker, R. 1981. Equity consideration in traditional full-cost allocation
practices: an axiomatic perspective, Joint Cost Allocations,S .M o r i a r t y ,
ed. Norman: University of Oklahoma.
[2] Bender, M., Chakrabarti, S., and Muthukrishnan, S. 1998. "Flow and
Stretch Metrics for Scheduling Continuous Job Streams," in Proc. 9th
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms.
[3] Chun, Y. , 2000. Agreement, Separability, and other Axioms for Quasi-
linear Social Choice Problems, Social Choice and Welfare, 17, 507-521.
[4] Chun, Y., 2004. A Note on Maniquet’s Characterizations of the Shapley
Value in Queuing Problems, mimeo, Seoul National University.
[5] Chun, Y., 2004. Consistency and Monotonicity in Sequencing Problems,
mimeo, Seoul National University.
[6] Curiel, I., G. Pederzoli and S. Tijs, 1989. Sequencing Games, European
Journal of Operational Research, 40, 344-351.
[7] Curiel, Il, H. Hamers and F. Klijn, 2002. Sequencing Games: a Survey,
in Chapters in Game Theory in Honor of Stef Tijs,P .B o r ma n dH .
Peters (eds.), pp. 27-50, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.
[8] De Frutos, M.A., 1999. Coalitional Manipulations in a Bankruptcy
Problem, Review of Economic Design, 4, 255-272.
[9] Demers A., S. Keshav and S. Shenker 1990. Analysis and simulation of
a fair queuing algorithm, Internetworking: Research and Experience, 1,
3-26.
[10] Dolan, R., 1978. Incentive Mechanisms for Priority Queueing Problems,
The Bell Journal of Economics 9, 421-436.
[11] Douceur, J., 2002. The Sybil Attack, Proceedings of the 1st International
Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS 2002), LNCS 2429, pp 251-
260.
[12] Fishburn, P., 1992. Induced binary probabilities and the linear ordering
polytope: a status report, Mathematical Social Sciences, 23, 67-80.
25[ 1 3 ]F r i e d m a n ,E . J .a n dH e n d e r s o n ,S . G .( 2 0 0 3 ) ." F a i r n e s sa n dE ﬃciency in
Web Server Protocols," in Proceedings of the 2003 ACM SIGMETRICS
International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer
Systems, 229-237, ACM Press.
[14] Hain R., and M. Mitra, 2001. Simple Sequencing Problems with Inter-
dependent Costs, mimeo, University of Bonn.
[15] Hardy G., J.E. Littlewood, and G. Polya, 1934. Inequalities,C a m b r i d g e
University press.
[16] Haviv, M.,2001. The Aumann-Shapley Price Mechanism for Allocating
Congestion Costs, Operation Research Letters, 29, 211-215.
[17] Haviv, M. and Y. Ritov, 1998. Externalities, Tangible Externalities,
and Queue Disciplines, Management Science, 44, 6, 850-858.
[18] Ju, B.G., 2003. Manipulations via Merging and Splitting in claim prob-
lems, Review of Economic Design, 8, 205-215.
[19] Ju, B.G., E. Miyagawa, and T. Sakai, 2003. Coalitional Manipulations
and Generalized Proportional Rules, mimeo, Columbia University.
[20] Kittsteiner, T. and B. Moldovanu, 2003. Auction-Based Queue Disci-
plines, mimeo, University of Bonn.
[21] Kittsteiner, T. and B. Moldovanu, 2003. Priority Auctions and Queue
Disciplines that Depend on Processing Time, mimeo, University of
Bonn.
[22] Klijn, F. and E. Sánchez, 2002. Sequencing Games Without a Com-
pletely SpeciﬁcI n i t i a lO r d e r ,Reports in Statistics and Operations Re-
search, Report 02-04, 1-17.
[23] Lawler, E., J.K. Lenstra, Kan A. Rinnooy, and D. Shmoys, 1993. Se-
quencing and Scheduling: Algorithms and Complexity, Chapter 9 in
Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science,V o l .4 ,
Elsevier.
[24] Maniquet, F., 2003. A Characterization of the Shapley Value in Queue-
ing Problems, Journal of Economic Theory, 109,1, 90-103.
26[25] Mitra, M., 2001. Mechanism Design in Queueing Problems, Economic
Theory, 17, 277-305.
[26] Mitra, M., 2002. Achieving the First Best in Sequencing Problems,
Review of Economic Design, 7, 75-91.
[27] Moulin, H., 1985 Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-linear Bar-
gaining, Econometrica, 53, 1, 49-67.
[28] Moulin, H., 1987. Equal or Proportional Division of a Surplus, and
Other Methods, International Journal of Game Theory, 16, 3, 161—186.
[29] Moulin H., 2002. The Proportional Random Allocation of Indivisible
Units, Social Choice and Welfare, 19,2,381-413.
[30] Moulin, H., 2004. On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting
and Transferring Jobs, mimeo, Rice University.
[31] Moulin, H., 2005. Minimizing the Worst Slowdown: Oﬀ-line and On-
line, mimeo, Rice University.
[32] Moulin, H. and Y. Sprumont, 2003. On Demand Responsiveness in
Additive Cost Sharing, forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory.
[33] Moulin, H. and R. Stong, 2002. Fair Queuing and other Probabilistic
Allocation Methods, Mathematics of Operations Research, 27, 1, 1-31.
[34] Moulin, H. and R. Stong, 2003. Filling a Multicolor Urn: an axiomatic
analysis, Games and Economic Behavior, 45, 242-269.
[35] Ozsoy, H., 2005. Coordinated Splitting in Probabilistic Scheduling,
mimeo, Rice University.
[36] Queyranne, M., 1993. Structure of a Simple Scheduling Polyhedron,
Mathematical Programming, 58, 263-285.
[37] Shapley, L.S., 1971. Core of Convex Games, International Journal of
Game Theory,1 ,1 1 - 2 6 .
[38] Sprumont, Y., 1998. Ordinal cost sharing. Journal of Economic Theory
81,1 2 6 - 1 6 2 .
27[39] Sprumont, Y., 2003. Aumann-Shapley pricing: a reconsideration of the
discrete case, mimeo, Universite de Montreal.
[40] Suijs, J., 1996. On Incentive Compatibility and Budget Balancedness
in Public Decision Making, Economic Design, 2, 193-209
[41] Wierman, A. and Harchol-Balter, M., 2003. Classifying Scheduling Poli-
cies with Respect to Unfairness in an M/GI/1, in Proceedings of ACM
Sigmetrics Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Sys-
tems.
11 Appendix: remaining proofs
11.1 Lemma 1
Statement i. Write F0(N,x) for the set of feasible proﬁles of expected
waits at (N,x),a n dC(N,x) for the core of (N,v(·,x)).A l s o u s e x · y for
the coordinatewise multiplication of vectors. Fix (N,x) and deﬁne e N = {i ∈
N|xi > 0}. Together the three following facts prove the statement:
1.If N = e N then y ∈ F0(N,x) ⇐⇒ x · y ∈ C(N,x)
2. y ∈ F0(N,x) ⇐⇒ {y[ h N] ∈ F0( e N,x[ h N]) and yi ∈ [0,
P
N xj]}
3. x · y ∈ C(N,x) ⇐⇒ x[ h N] · y[ h N] ∈ C( e N,x[ h N]).
Fact 3 requires no proof and fact 2 is clear: once we order jobs randomly in
e N to achieve y[ h N], where we schedule null jobs does not matter and we can
achieve any y[NÂ h N] within the announced bounds.
Now ﬁx (N,x) with x À 0,a n df o ra l lσ ∈ Φ(N) let yσ be the proﬁle
of wait under σ namely yσ
i =
P
P(i;σ) xj,w h e r eP(i;σ)={j ∈ N|σ(j) ≤
σ(i)}.S e t P−(i;σ)=P(i;σ)Âi. Routine computation shows (x · yσ)=
v(P(i;σ),x) − v(P−(i;σ),x),n a m e l yx · yσ is the vector of marginal contri-
butions in the game (N,v(·,x)).A sv(·,x) is supermodular, a classic result
(Shapley [1971]) says that C(N,x) is the convex hull of x·yσ,σ∈ Φ(N).O n
the other hand F0(N,x) is the convex hull of yσ,σ∈ Φ(N).T h i sg i v e sf a c t
1 because x À 0.
Statement ii. "Only if" is clear from statement i). "If" follows because
such a vector minimizes the sum
P
h N xi · yi +
P
NÂ h N yi over F0(N,x).
2811.2 Proposition 1
Step 1 Preliminary result.
We ﬁx an arbitrary parametric rule {Fa,a > 0} where the cdfs may have
atoms. We start by a reformulation of the probability that a job of size b
precedes one of size a,n a m e l yθ(a,b) in (5). Recall that each Fa lives in the
space H of non-decreasing, right-continuous real-valued functions on R+ with
bounded range. For such a function F we write ∂F(z)=F(z)−F−(z) for the
jump of F at z,w h e r eF−(z) i st h el e f tl i m i t .W ed e n o t eb yF+ the integral
of these jumps, namely the staircase function F+(z)=
P
t≤z ∂F(t) (the sum
is well deﬁned because F is non-decreasing). Check that F0 = F − F+ is
continuous and non decreasing.
The canonical decomposition F = F0+F+ allows us to deﬁne the integral R ∞
0 F · dG, for any two F,G ∈ H.I f F,G are both continuous, this is the
familiar Stieltjes integral (e.g., Hardy et al [1938]). For arbitrary F,Gin H we





J(F) ∂F(z)·(G(∞)−G(z)) = (F+ ·G)(∞)− P
J(F) ∂F(z) · G(z),a n d
R
F · dG+ =
P
J(G) F(z) · ∂G(z). These combine





























Now for two independent random variables Za,Z b with cdfs Fa,F b,w e
have




I n d e e dt h ee q u a l i t yo n l yo c c u r sw h e nb o t hd r a w sa r ei nt h ea t o m i cp a r to f























where the last term in the LHS is the probability of {Zb ≤ Za}∩{Za ∈ J(a)}
and the sum of the two middle terms is that of {Zb ≤ Za} ∩ {Zb ∈ J(b)}.


















∂Fa(z) · ∂Fb(z) (15)
Step 2: Demand monotonic parametric rules.
In this Step we show that the parametric rule {Fa,a>0} is demand monotonic
if {a ≤ b} ⇒ {Fb(z) ≤ Fa(z) for all z} (in the sense of stochastic dominance).
Let {Fa,a>0} deﬁne a parametric rule. We develop θ(a,b) with the help of















The ﬁrst integral term is non decreasing in a,b e c a u s eFa(z) is non increasing
in a.T h eﬁrst sum is also non decreasing, but the variation of ∂Fa(z) (hence
of the second sum) in a is ambiguous. However, for any z ∈ J(a)∩J(b) the
corresponding terms in the second and third sums are





b (z)) · ∂Fb(z)
and the desired monotonicity follows.
Here is a demand monotonic parametric rule for which a → Za is not
stochastic-dominance monotonic. For a<1,l e tZa =2with probability one,
and for a ≥ 1, let Za =1or 3 with respective probabilities 1
4 and 3
4.
Step 3: Proof of Proposition 1. We must show inequality (4) when
Fa · Fb ≤ Fa+b holds for all a,b > 0.F i xS,i,i / ∈ S,a n db,aj,j∈ S as in the
30premises of (4), and set a =
Pm






J(a)∩J(b) ∂Fa ·∂Fb.N e x tw ec o m p u t eγ = prob{maxS σ(j) <σ (i)|(b,aj)}
with the help of e Zk, the k-th order statistics of the independent variables Zaj
(thus e Z1 =m i n 1,..,m Zaj and e Zm =m a x 1,..,m Zaj). We have
γ = prob{e Zm <Z b} +
1
2




prob{e Zm−2 < e Zm−1 = e Zm = Zb} + ·· ≤ prob{e Zm <Z b} +
1
2
prob{e Zm = Zb} =
=
R ∞
0 Fa1 · .. · Fam · dFb − 1
2
P
J ∗∩J(b) ∂(Fa1 · . · Fam)(z) · ∂Fb(z)
where J ∗ = ∪1,..,mJ(aj). Mimicking the argument in Step 2 it is easy to
show that T(G)=
R
G · dF − 1
2
P
∂G · ∂F is monotonic in the sense that
{G1(z) ≤ G2(z) for all z} =⇒ T(G1) ≤ T(G2). Applying this to G1 =
Fa1 · .. · Fam and G2 = Fa completes the proof of (4).
11.3 Proof of theorems 1 and 2
Step 1
Let ρ be a split-proof scheduling rule, and let θ
i,j(a,b)=prob{σ(j) <
σ(i)|(a,b)} be the probability that job j of size b precedes job i of size a in the
{i,j} problem. Then θ
i,j = θ is independent of i,j. Moreover a → θ(a,c−a)
is subadditive in a.F i n a l l ysupb θ(a,b) · b ≥ a for all a, namely λ(2) ≥ 2.
Proof. That θ
i,j does not depend on i,j was established in the proof of
statement "only if"in Lemma 2 (note that Separability of ρ is not needed for
the argument). Next we deﬁne for all a,c such that 0 ≤ a ≤ c, f(a,c)=
θ(a,c − a).F i x a1,a 2,a 3 > 0 and consider the split of user 2 in problem
{1,2},(a1,a 2+a3) to users 2,3 in {1,2,3},(a1,a 2,a 3). Split-proofness implies
f(a1,a 1 + a2 + a3)=θ(a1,a 2 + a3) ≥ prob{1 is last in (a1,a 2,a 3)}
Exchanging the role of agents gives f(ai,a 1 + a2 + a3) ≥ prob{i is last in
(a1,a 2,a 3)} for i =1 ,2,3. Summing the three inequalities and using 1 −
f(a3,a 1 + a2 + a3)=f(a1 + a2,a 1 + a2 + a3) (because θ(a,b)+θ(b,a)=1 )
gives the desired subadditivity property.
Finally we ﬁx a>0, m ∈ N,a n do b s e r v ef(m · a,2m · a)=1
2. Su-
peradditivity of f implies f(a,2m · a) ≥ 1
mf(m · a,2m · a),o re q u i v a l e n t l y
θ(a,(2m − 1) · a) ≥ 1
2m, from which supb θ(a,b) · b ≥ a follows at once.
31Step 2: Statements i and ii in Theorem 1.
Statement i follows at once from Step 1 and equation (3) for separable rules.
For statement ii), ﬁx a separable method ρ for which θ
i,j may depend on i,j.
Apply Ranking to N = {i,j} and xi = a,xj = b such that a ≤ b.W eg e t
θ
i,j(a,b) · b ≤ θ







and λ(n) ≤ n then follows from the non anonymous version of (3).
Step 3
Let ρ b eas p l i t - p r o o fr u l e ,w i t ht h ec o r r e s p o n d i n gθ for two person problems
as in Step 1. If one of Ranking, or {δ(2) ≤ 2}, or {λ(2) ≤ 2} holds, then
θ(a,b)= a
a+b for all a,b.
A s s u m eR a n k i n g . A si nt h ea b o v es t e p ,w eh a v et h e nθ(a,b) ≤ a
a+b ⇔
f(a,c) ≤ a
c for all a,c,0 <a<c . By subadditivity of f in a,w eg e t









Assume λ(2) ≤ 2.B y ( 3 ) w e h a v e θ(a,b) ≤ a
b for all a,b.E q u i v a l e n t l y ,
f(a,c) ≤ a
c−a for all a,c,0 <a<c .N o wa p p l yk times the subadditivity of











implying f(a,c) ≤ a
c and the desired conclusion as above.
Assume δ(2) ≤ 2. Then, with the notations in the proof of Lemma 6,
δ(2) = 1 + β holds even for a non separable rule, provided θ
i,j does not
depend on i,j, implied here by Split-proofness and Step 1. Thus





≤ 1 ⇔ f(a,c) ≤
a
c − 2a
for all a,c,0 <a<
c
2
Applying k times the subadditivity of f as above, we get f(a,c) ≤ a
c− a
2k−1 ,




2 , f must be linear in a on
]0, c
2[, and once more subadditivity on ]c
2,c[ gives f(a,c) ≤ a
c everywhere and
we are done.
Step 4: End of proof.I f t h e r u l e ρ is separable and split-proof, it is
anonymous (lemma 2), and λ(2) ≤ 2 is equivalent to λ(n) ≤ n for any n.I fρ
32meets the premises of the statement in Step 3, and is separable as well, then
the function θ deﬁnes its method for any number of jobs, and this method is
proportional. This proves statement iii in Theorem 1.
Now suppose ρ meets the premises of the statement in Step 3, and is
recursive as well. We ﬁx an arbitrary problem (N,x) and consider the split
of 2 in problem {1,2},(x1,
P
NÂ1 xi) to {2,3,..,n} in problem (N,x). Split-
proofness gives π1(x) ≤ θ(x1,
P
NÂ1 xi)= x1 S
N xi.R e p e a t t h e a r g u m e n t f o r
all i:a sπ(x) is a probability distribution, it must be the Proportional one,
thus by Recursivity ρ is the Proportional rule.¥
11.4 A characterization of the quasi-proportional fam-
ily
Proposition 3
A scheduling rule is quasi-proportional if and only if it is separable, recursive,
anonymous and meets the following Positivity property
prob{σ(j) <σ (i)|x} > 0 for all N,x,x À 0,a n da l li,j.
Positivity is needed in the above statement: Shortest (or Longest) Jobs First
meets the other three properties.
Proof
Only the " if" statement requires a proof. Let ρ be a rule with the four
stated properties, and π(N,x) be the associated probability distribution of
the last scheduled agent. By Anonymity, it takes the form π(n,x), n = |N|,
and is symmetric in all variables xi.F i xn,x and use the simpliﬁed notation
{1,2,..,n − 1|x} for the event {σ(1) <σ (2) <. .<σ (n − 1)|x}.A s i m p l e





By Separability and Recursivity, the summation in the RHS is πn−1(x) ·
prob{1,2,..,n − 2|x[NÂn,n−1]}.W r i t i n gπ(n,x) simply as π(x),w eg e t
(1−πn(x))·prob{1,2,..,n−1|x[NÂn]} = πn−1(x)·prob{1,2,..,n−2|x[NÂn,n−1]}
(16)
33Apply (16) ﬁrst for n =3 ,w i t ht h en o t a t i o nθ(b,a)=π2((a,b)) for the
probability that a job of size a precedes one of size b.W eg e t(1 − π3(x)) ·
θ(b,a)=π2(x) for all x =( a,b,c), x À 0. By Positivity, θ(b,a) > 0,s o
π2(x)=0would imply π1(x)=0 . Exchanging the role of agents 1 and 3,w e




















π1 =1 ,as t a n d a r d




wj(b) for all i,j in {1,2,3}.A n o n y m i t yg i v e swi = w for all i,a n d
we conclude πi(x)=
wi(xi)
w1(x1)+w2(x2)+w3(x3) for all proﬁles x À 0 of dimension 3.
Finally we show πi(x)=
wi(xi) S
wj(xj) for all (N,x), by an induction argument
on n = |N|. Assume this holds up to n − 1.T h i s i m p l i e s prob{1,2,..,n−
2|xNÂn,n−1} 6=0 , therefore (ab) becomes (1−πn(x))·πn−1(xNÂn)=πn−1(x).
Now π(x) À 0 and the desired claim follow easily.
34